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Abstract
Ebola seems to be a particular risk in conflict affected contexts. All three of the countries most affected by the
2014-15 outbreak have a complex conflict-affected recent history. Other major outbreaks in the recent past, in
Northern Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of Congo are similarly afflicted although outbreaks have also
occurred in stable settings. Although the 2014-15 outbreak in West Africa has received more attention than almost
any other public health issue in recent months, very little of that attention has focused on the complex interaction
between conflict and its aftermath and its implications for health systems, the emergence of the disease and the
success or failure in controlling it.
The health systems of conflict-affected states are characterized by a series of weaknesses, some common to other
low and even middle income countries, others specifically conflict-related. Added to this is the burden placed on
health systems by the aggravated health problems associated with conflict. Other features of post conflict health
systems are a consequence of the global institutional response.
Comparing the experience of Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone in the emergence and management of Ebola
outbreaks in 2000-1 and in 2014-15 respectively highlights how the various elements of these conflict affected
societies came together with international agencies responses to permit the outbreak of the disease and then to
successfully contain it (in Northern Uganda) or to fail to do so before a catastrophic cost had been incurred (in
Sierra Leone).
These case studies have implications for the types of investments in health systems that are needed to enable
effective response to Ebola and other zoonotic diseases where they arise in conflict- affected settings.
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Introduction
Recent outbreaks of Ebola have disproportionately oc-
curred in localities that have been badly affected by
conflict in recent history. The inter-related civil wars
affecting Liberia and Sierra Leone devastated the two
countries throughout the 1990s, resulting in up to half a
million deaths among less than 10 million people in the
two countries combined, many more displaced and others
co-opted into military service as children [1, 2]. The Liber-
ian and Sierra Leonean conflicts spilled into Guinea
resulting in an estimated 100,000 Guineans being dis-
placed, 200,000 Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in
Guinea in the early 2000s and some thousands of Guinean
deaths.1 In 2004, there were still 59,000 refugees in the
marginal environment of the forest region of Guinea,
where the virus later emerged [3]. After the death of Presi-
dent Conté in 2008, Guinea fell into further governmental
and civil disarray resulting in a series of coup d’états and
periods of violence which have now subsided [3]. Other
outbreaks, for example in Northern Uganda and in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, where the disease is
thought to have originated, have occurred in equally
conflict-affected areas.
It is well understood that conflict and population
displacement on a large scale poses significant risks for
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infectious disease, combined with livelihood disruption
and food and water shortages [4]. Ford describes the asso-
ciations between conflict and the re-emergence of African
Trypanosomiasis in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Angola and Uganda from the 1970s on-
wards [5], while Tong reviews the challenges of control
during active conflict in DRC [6]. Bausch et al. [7] high-
light the role played by political unrest in DRC in delaying
a response to an outbreak of Marburg virus. Spiegel et al.
[8] confirm a statistical association between the occur-
rence of natural disasters, complex emergencies and epi-
demics in the period 1995-2004.
War is one of a number of shocks that drives popula-
tions to marginal subsistence strategies with among
many implications a likely increase in the recourse to
bush meat and forest-based livelihoods. For example,
crops may be deliberately or collaterally destroyed,
people may temporarily or permanently lose access to
land from which they normally derive subsistence or
may otherwise become separated from their usual means
of livelihood [9, 10]. These problems may last long into
post conflict periods for example wherever population
displacement persists. During conflict, active combatants
may experience more short term exposure to forest con-
ditions as they advance, retreat, conduct reconnaissance
or engage in other war related purpose.
While it has been widely recognized that failure to
manage the initial emergence of Ebola and prevent a full
scale outbreak is premised on the ineffective operation
of certain health system functions including early detec-
tion of cases, contact tracing, and timely response to
outbreaks (for example [11]), if initial outbreaks are
more likely in conflict-affected settings, strategies to
both prevent and control outbreaks need to engage with
the complexities of health and other systems in conflict-
affected contexts. This paper focuses on published ac-
counts of the two Ebola outbreaks of Northern Uganda
(2000-2001) and West Africa (2014-15) and other work
in progress in the two countries with which the authors
are associated, which is building an understanding of the
specificities of the health systems of conflict affected
countries and working in both Northern Uganda and Si-
erra Leone (hence we focus on the Sierra Leone experi-
ence of the West African outbreak). It aims to identify
the factors that contributed to the relatively successful
control of the outbreak in Northern Uganda compared
to Sierra Leone and to trace the extent to which both
outbreak and control were affected by the histories of
conflict in both settings.
What do we mean by ‘conflict affected’?
The most used term among a set of terms that label states
weak, dysfunctional or subject to the worst outcomes is
the term ‘fragile’. This has been defined by DFID [12] as
covering ‘those [states] where the government cannot or
will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people,
including the poor” ([8]:p7), and the OECD definition [13]
is similar although more specific about the domains of
core functions: ‘states are fragile when states lack political
will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed
for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the
security and human rights of their populations’. However
these concepts of fragility are both imprecise and inclusive
of highly heterogenous state characteristics [14]. To con-
sider a subset of fragile states that are ‘conflict affected’ in-
creases the specificity somewhat.
However, in the broadest sense, we are all ‘conflict
affected’, either because the place we live has at some
time been the location of conflict, because we are all
interconnected inhabitants of a conflict-affected world,
or because conflict is defined as encompassing the mild-
est of differences of opinion. It follows that the defin-
ition of conflict affectedness involves specifying time
period, area whose inhabitants are affected, and the na-
ture of behaviors that constitutes conflict. Moseley [15]
defines war as ‘a state of organized open-ended collect-
ive conflict’ (p14), distinguishing it from a street brawl
by the concept of organization; from a boxing match by
the concept of open-endedness and from a personal feud
by the concept of collectivity. While, as the author
acknowledges, the definition remains incomplete and
retains ambiguities, all these characteristics are consist-
ent with our meaning of the term ‘conflict’ here. Brown
et al. [16] recognize the complexity of the definition of
‘post-conflict’ situations and propose a typology based
on milestones in the pathway from violent hostilities to
economic recovery such as peace agreement, disarma-
ment and demobilization, and the establishment of a
functioning state, recognizing that movement occurs in
both directions. Collier and Hoefller [17] have estimated
that 40 % of countries relapse into conflict after a period
of apparent recovery. We consider that ‘conflict-affected-
ness’ implies all intermediate points in the pathway and
can (but need not) affect countries indefinitely.
Health systems in stable and conflict-affected
settings
Newbrander et al. [18] have proposed the following list
of characteristics of post conflict health systems:
 Insufficient coordination, oversight and monitoring
of health services
 Lack of equity in who receives the available health
services
 Lack of mechanisms for developing, establishing and
implementing national health policies
 Non-operational health information systems
 Inadequate management capacity
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 Inability to provide health services to a large
proportion of the population
 Ineffective or nonexistent referral systems
 Lack of infrastructure for delivering health services
 Nonexistent or inadequate capacity-building systems
This list is a fairly comprehensive account of charac-
teristics that are common or typical of the health sys-
tems of low and even middle income countries as a
whole, although the critical domain of human resource
constraints is surprisingly absent. However, it might be
argued that they are likely to be more acute in conflict-
affected health systems to the extent that attempts to
resolve such issues are likely to have stalled during active
conflict periods in which other concerns may be consid-
ered more pressing. In addition, active conflicts such as
wars may directly have affected elements such as infra-
structure or management capacity, and governance
mechanisms may have been diverted to provide over-
sight of the extremes of conflict-related activity.
Other characteristics have been proposed that suggest
health systems in conflict-affected contexts can be differ-
entiated qualitatively [19, 20]. Some of these are clear
consequences of conflict and violence such as the deser-
tion by health workers of conflict zones (where they are
often at particular risk in excess of that of the general
population), the damage to infrastructure and the loss of
disease surveillance capabilities and records. The flight
of health professionals from conflict affected states and
areas does not only produce generalized shortages but
skews those shortages to those areas that have been
most insecure, often rural and remote ones and towards
more clinical (emergency response) and away from pub-
lic health functions. In some cases it creates a missing
generation of health professionals, where there has been
a prolonged period in which there has been no or little
training and recruitment. Relatively inexperienced staff
may find themselves in senior positions, for example
managing national level programmes and negotiating
with international agencies, which may undermine
the ability of national institutions to lead the related
agenda [21].
Post-conflict health systems can be inundated with aid
in multiple forms as a country is considered to have a
strong case for investment on the grounds of need (the
country has for some time been unable to absorb aid
effectively and the effects of war leave a legacy of hu-
manitarian concerns) and on the grounds that invest-
ment may have the additional benefit of consolidating
the peace process. This places requirements on often
inexperienced officials to manage multiple aid-related
actors including international NGOs, bilateral and multi-
lateral agencies, all staffed by senior officials with exten-
sive experience of other contexts, but quite often not
experience of the country or region itself. Inevitably,
these voices are more effective in directing policy
agendas than local ones can be, even though they may
be less able to understand the implications of policy
advice in the specific context [21].
Furthermore, it has been argued (for example by Kruk
et al. [4]) that there is an onus on health systems policies
to communicate political and social values that promote
reconciliation, inclusion and confidence in a new gov-
ernment. The extent to which the policies in practice
succeed or fail in these respects assumes greater import-
ance not only for health sector objectives but for the
success of peace processes. The media may also play an
important role here. It can be alarmist and can under-
mine government efforts as part of its political opposition,
or it can support a public health strategy understood to be
in the population’s best interest. Lowicki-Zucca et al. [22]
provide three case studies of reporting in relation to HIV/
AIDS in the context of conflict in Sudan, Uganda and
Guinea and identify a series of stigmatizing, inaccurate
and misleading statements, often repeated from previous
news stories and argue that such reporting reinforces
stigma and discrimination and ultimately increases the
vulnerability of all populations irrespective of their rela-
tionship to the conflict.
Conflict affected health systems have to deal with in-
creased levels of conditions associated with violence,
infectious disease outbreaks that follow population disrup-
tion (of which Ebola may be an extreme example) and
mental health problems that follow from the stress and
dislocation associated with conflict [4].
The Ebola outbreak in Uganda, 2000-1
Ebola emerged in the conflict-affected Gulu district of
Uganda in October 2000, with two clusters first coming
to the attention of authorities, among a group of funeral
attendees, and among health staff at St Mary’s Lacor
hospital, run by an Italian Roman Catholic mission in
the district [23]. The index case was never identified,
but it is thought that movement of people across the
Ugandan, Sudanese and the Democratic Republic of Congo
borders is likely to have been implicated [24], and it was
speculated but never confirmed that the disease had been
carried by Sudanese rebels operating in Gulu,2 or by the
Ugandan military on return from Congo [25]. The poten-
tial for troop movements to be associated with disease out-
breaks has also been demonstrated by the post-earthquake
cholera outbreak in Haiti [26].
The disease infected 425 people, 224 of whom died, a
case fatality rate of 53 %. 17 among the 224 dead were
health workers. Centres for Disease control (CDC) [27],
Lane and Nicoll [24], Okware et al. [28], and Lamunu et
al. [23] provide descriptive accounts of the control
response that by 16th January 2001 had brought the
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outbreak officially under control, with the last confirmed
case occurring on the 14th January. The Ministry of
Health was first alerted to the outbreak on 8th October
2000 and a National Task Force (NTF) was established
on 12th October 2000 to coordinate the response; inter-
ministerial and district task forces followed. Response
strategies consisted of contact tracing, public education
and community mobilization, isolation of cases, infec-
tion control through universal precaution and safe burial
of the dead using trained burial teams. CDC established
an on-site field laboratory for case confirmation. The
NTF ensured that international support contributed to
the agreed strategy and work plan: more than 25 inter-
national organizations contributed.
The cited accounts credit the success of the control
efforts to a number of factors: prompt action and effect-
ive coordination at both national and district levels; con-
ducive community protocols for dealing with infectious
disease among the Acholi people [29]; effective public
communication; use of trained burial teams to ensure
safe burial in cases of suspicious deaths; effective surveil-
lance mechanisms reaching into communities by the
employment of community level scouts, trained for the
purpose. The role of the media is highlighted by Okware
et al. [28] as supportive of the control efforts, educating
the public about control behaviours, reassuring and lim-
iting panic, and explaining government actions such as
quarantines. Media briefings from the National Task
Force were organised twice per day. Despite newspaper
stories reporting panic, stigmatizing reactions and a mix
of likely effective and ineffective responses to the risk
posed by the outbreak, Kinsman’s [25] account of the
media’s coverage does not suggest that the media was
itself a significant spur to these reactions. Moreover, it
appears that the media was used strategically by the
Ministry of Health as a means of advising the population
on appropriate precautions and health providers on con-
trol measures.
The effective response may have been supported by
the country’s successful management of its AIDS epi-
demic, widely attributed to its strategy of openness and
leading to an understanding of the implications of being
seen to hide information in public health emergencies.
Uganda’s ‘open’ AIDS policy initiated in the 1980s en-
couraged officials at all levels to raise AIDS regularly at
public meetings [25]. Uganda had also very recently con-
trolled its largest recorded cholera outbreak that
emerged at the end of 1997 [30] with likely significant
opportunities for learning relative to the Ebola outbreak.
The control effort was not without problems. It was
forced to operate in the context of continued conflict
with army escorts employed to accompany surveillance
teams to insecure areas [23] and the death of one scout
during an attack on a medical team [25], although
Okware et al. [28] report cooperation by rebel groups
with the control effort in some instances. Supplies for
barrier nursing were scarcely sufficient in the early phase
of the outbreak and prior training had been insufficient
[31] and 14 of 22 health workers were infected during
the establishment of the first isolation ward [24] leading
to the reinforcement of infection-control measures [27].
Health workers were not at first compensated for the
additional risks or their families compensated for their
deaths, until approximately two months into the out-
break [25].
Hewlett and Amola [29] describe the experience of the
outbreak from the community’s perspective. The illness
was first understood as any other, with recourse to a mix
of biomedical and traditional treatments, the latter in
particular responsible for significant use of family re-
sources to secure traditional healers’ intervention. When
this failed, the illness was reclassified in traditional
terms, producing community responses including isola-
tion of the sick, contact only by survivors of the illness
or the elderly and constrained movement between vil-
lages, a set of responses that was highly consistent with
those biomedically recommended. Burial practices were
also changed in ways that may have reduced transmis-
sion, but only after the initial phase when normal burial
practices were probably associated with a high level of
transmission, particularly to women who are most
exposed by traditional practices. Issues of trust between
local communities and Euro-Americans may have af-
fected the control effort as people sought to evade trans-
port to hospital for fear of theft of their body parts if
they died, initial post-mortems and sample collection
having generated such rumours. The speed and lack of
public visibility of burials conducted under control pro-
tocols contributed to this fear. Stigma also significantly
affected survivors in ways likely to lead people to seek to
conceal the early stages of illness [29, 24].
While some desertion from their posts by health
workers is documented [31, 25] the more dominant
behavior was to remain despite the risks and at times
inadequate protection and this may reflect the reality
that the health workforce already persisted in delivering
services in the midst of conflict in which they were regu-
larly at risk.
Life histories with health workers in the Acholi sub-
region found that the Ebola outbreak of 2000-1 added to
their ongoing challenges, such as experiencing injury
and living under threat, with increased workloads and
minimal professional support [32]. Those who stayed
(largely mid-level cadres) were supported by encourage-
ment from managers and elders, and appear to have
been intrinsically motivated, taking pride in their work
as health workers. Health workers coped with increased
workload by taking on higher levels of responsibility
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than those they were qualified to do and by working in
shifts. Allowances for outreach from NGOs to cope with
epidemics such as Ebola also helped to keep them going
in the absence of regular salaries, and other support
from NGOs including unprecedented levels of training
and engagement with international experts were also
motivating [32, 33].
Despite the inevitable difficulties, Uganda appears to
have managed well in the context of a conflict affected
health system by providing good national leadership, likely
benefiting from the national institutions in the central part
of the country which had avoided recent conflict, enabling
better coordination and oversight than might typically be
expected. Uganda’s emergence from conflict at the na-
tional level was relatively immature, the outbreak occur-
ring only 15 years after Yoweri Museveni had come to
power and brought stability after a long period character-
ized by intermittent civil war and localized conflict. Never-
theless, its institutional development in that period has
been considered rapid. Museveni’s first term until 2001
was strongly supported by foreign aid and the country
experienced rapid economic growth [34, 35] While the
North of the country generally failed to benefit from these
trends [36] the availability of the national resources and
institutions appear to have been a factor in the Ebola
response.
As the conflict in the North was ongoing, the region
was not at that stage significantly penetrated by a major
international aid presence with concomitant concerns of
co-ordination and sovereignty, thereby easing the coordin-
ation task. A major resource appears to have been pro-
vided by the St Mary’s Lacor hospital, a well-equipped,
long standing and internationally supported and partially
staffed facility. The standard of care and facilities at this
hospital probably underpinned the comment of a WHO
official that local facilities in Uganda were ‘outstanding
compared to the classic Ebola situation’ [25].
Distrust of the national government, implicated in the
regional conflict, appears to have constrained the control
effort with respect to suspicions about the rationale for
rapid and isolated burial and beliefs such as those that
implicated Ugandan government forces in the origin of
the outbreak. Overall, though, the national effort appears
to have secured community acceptance in the main, and
the success in controlling the outbreak may have contrib-
uted to confidence in the national government.
The Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone 2014-15
The 2014-15 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone originated in
Guinea; the first case is thought to have been a child of
2 years in Guinea’s forest region in December 2013, most
likely infected by a fruit bat. The disease had spread to
health workers in the town of Guéckédou by January 2014
but the Ministry of Health was not notified until March,
2014 after which teams of health workers from both the
Ministry of Health and the international non-governmental
organization Médecins Sans Frontières (which was already
present in the area through involvement in a malaria pro-
ject) became involved. Blood samples were sent to Europe
for analysis [37]. Until May 2014, cases in Liberia and Sierra
Leone were very few but rose sharply at that point. By June
21st 2015, 13,059 cases and 3, 928 deaths had resulted (case
fatality rate 30 %)3.
Basic control measures, including early diagnosis with
patient isolation, infection prevention control, contact tra-
cing, barrier nursing, disinfection of contaminated objects
and areas and safe burial appear to have been imple-
mented slowly in all three countries due to shortages of
staff, trained in infection prevention and control and lack
of personal protective equipment, and limited laboratory,
clinical management and surveillance capacities. Signifi-
cant problems of lack of cooperation between population,
national health system and international response teams
also affected the success of control measures [38]. Deep
rooted traditional beliefs played a part in the delays, as did
lack of trust in the government and health system, which
may be related to people’s experience of conflict,4 and of
multiple decades of corrupt and partial treatment by gov-
ernment, especially with respect to ethnic and internal
regional rivalries,5 both before and after the conflict [39].
The disease quickly moved across borders and to popula-
tion centres where it was able to take root. High levels of
population mobility – perhaps seven fold levels elsewhere
in the world, have been implicated.6 The early media
response in the region appears also to have been unhelp-
ful, accusing the government of incompetence and cor-
ruption which, whether accurate or not, did not support
public health measures. Government responses of at-
tempts at media censorship compounded the difficulty7.8
Even after the situation was declared to be a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern in August
2014, the response in Sierra Leone and its neighbours
continued to be sluggish. In September, a total of 1,152
beds were estimated to be needed for Ebola cases in
Sierra Leone, only 28 % were available and only an add-
itional 25 % pledged to be set up by an identified part-
ner. There were not even plans for 46 % of the
estimated beds needed. Laboratory capacity was still in
the process of being established; a mobile laboratory set
up in Freetown had the capacity to undertake less than
100 tests per day; laboratories in the Northern and
Southern regions were reported to be non-functional.
Community level interventions were reported to be
faring better with surveillance programmes reporting
coverage of 90 % ‘where contact tracing is being carried
out’; house-to-house campaigns reaching 75 % of all
households; and burial teams operating in all affected
districts.9
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Despite recent improvements linked to the Free Health
Care Initiative [40], the available health workforce is still
inadequate and maldistributed and in most cases lacks the
skills and training for the job at hand. Wurie and Witter
[41] reported a chronically understaffed, demotivated, ill
equipped, overworked health workforce in general, work-
ing in conditions described as poor, supported by inad-
equate logistics and resources and inadequate levels of
health education and promotion. Also documented are
non-payment or delayed payment of financial incentives
implemented to motivate, attract and retain health
workers in rural postings [41, 42]. This also emerged as an
issue for concern as challenges were faced in the payment
of risk allowances to frontline health care workers. In
addition an enabling environment for practicing infection
prevention and control was lacking. Collectively, these
demotivating factors encouraged attrition from the health
workforce and exacerbated the lack of trust between
service users and health service providers. Service users
were more accustomed to seeking health services from
traditional healers instead of health facilities, particularly
in the early phase of the outbreak.
Training pathways in Sierra Leone are clinically domi-
nated and public health training is limited, implying that
front line health workers had limited expertise in man-
aging infection and that functions such as surveillance
and contact tracing were largely unstaffed. Conse-
quently, the majority of health specialists at the fore-
front, in the early phase of the outbreak were
international experts flown in by international develop-
ment partners, which delayed the response.
Sierra Leone was at a similar distance from national
conflict in 2014 as Uganda in 2001, but it had recovered
little from the paralysis of the economy and provision of
public services and the destruction of infrastructure and
governmental institutions wreaked by the conflict. More-
over, the conflict was linked to and compounded socio-
economic and political divisions which predated it [43,
44]. Hanlon [45] describes the recreation of the political
and economic conditions that fuelled the conflict in the
post conflict settlement. The public health system in the
aftermath of the conflict was practically collapsed. Only
16 % of the health centres were still functioning by 1996,
mainly in Freetown [46]. While one of the tragedies of
Ebola was that it came at a time when the health system
was starting to recover - with reforms introduced since
2010 which reduced financial barriers for users while in-
creasing support for and accountability of staff [40, 47],
it was still badly affected by its pre- and post-conflict
legacy. A ‘Service Availability and Readiness Assessment’
[48] found Sierra Leone lagging behind countries includ-
ing Burkina Faso, Cambodia and Haiti in measures of
health system capacity. The accumulated experience has
led households to depend on informal and mixed care
seeking, while from the health worker side, many staff
were unofficial, working off payroll until recently and
funded through informal payments from patients [40].
Another feature which appears to have hampered re-
sponses in Sierra Leone is the lack of decentralised
authority within the health sector. Although decentralisa-
tion was initiated in 2004, core functions like hiring,
deploying and managing staff remained highly centralised
[41] impeding local responsiveness, a problem exacerbated
by slow information and direction from the centre, as was
the case in the Ebola outbreak. A recent study of district
dynamics (pre-Ebola) highlighted the need to empower
the DHMTs with the necessary tools to redress the power
imbalances between them and the other actors, including
international NGOs, at local level [49]. Some commentary
suggests the possibility of the heavy NGO involvement in
healthcare in Sierra Leone and Liberia being one of the
reasons for the delay in the control of the epidemic
because of the lack of investment in the meso-level of
health sector administration [50].
A number of factors that are not clearly conflict related
are also likely to have made control of the outbreak more
difficult. The situation is thought to have been signifi-
cantly complicated by the centre of the outbreak occur-
ring amidst three international borders, giving rise to
specific difficulties of co-ordination because the constella-
tion of international agencies in each are markedly differ-
ent, dominated by France in Guinea, the UK in Sierra
Leone and the US in Liberia . International support to
control the epidemic in the three countries whose systems
were acknowledged to be weak failed to materialize.
WHO ‘failed catastrophically’ in identifying, responding
and alerting the international community to the outbreak
([51]: p1550). Peter Piot, one of the team that originally
identified the Ebola virus in Zaïre (now DRC), is quoted
as suggesting that it may have been scarred by its experi-
ence of the swine flu threat in 2009, when it was widely
condemned for over-reaction, while others considered that
the reaction was characterized by complacency . With
earlier epidemics (the worst having been the Ugandan
2000-1 outbreak) quickly controlled, economic and polit-
ical concerns may have been allowed to dominate public
health ones.
Conclusions
Conflict and its aftermath are among the factors that
increase the opportunity for the Ebola virus to transmit
from a forest animal to a human by disrupting livelihoods
and living arrangements. Those whose normal subsistence
is undermined, for example because their homestead is
made insecure and those who are active conflict partici-
pants, appear to be at increased risk of being infected.
The disruption to public health systems that is a com-
mon effect of conflict undermines rapid case detection,
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contact tracing and quarantine arrangements. The un-
certainties associated with the first Ugandan case in
2000 indicate the extent to which the virus had taken
hold before it was recognized. Multiple theories about
the index case implicating active combatants from either
side and refugees, in turn, implicate the chaos associated
with conflict at this stage.
The depleted state of health systems that are conflict-
affected undermines control efforts. Damaged infrastruc-
ture, lost records, depleted health workforce and weak
governance reflected in ineffective management, support
systems, supplies systems and maldistribution of resources
combine to frustrate effective public health intervention.
The problems are worsened if international support is
fragmented and poorly co-ordinated, or directed by people
with little understanding of local context.
Table 1 compares a number of key features of the two
cases studies suggesting that differences in local, national
and international responses to the initial outbreaks are
likely to have played a significant role in their different
outcomes.
The Uganda experience in 2000-1 shows that despite
the unfavorable conditions of a conflict affected environ-
ment, effective containment and swift control can be
achieved. Some features of the Ugandan case seem to
contribute to an explanation of that success. One clear
difference between it and the Sierra Leone case is that
stable governance arrangements appear to have been re-
established more effectively in the post conflict period of
the South of the country allowing established national
institutions of governance to oversee a competent re-
sponse including effective co-ordination of international
agencies. In contrast, aid co-ordination problems have
been implicated as among those undermining control
efforts in Sierra Leone and West Africa more generally.
At the centre of control efforts in Northern Uganda was
St Mary Lacor hospital in Gulu, an NGO hospital that had
established resilient systems capable of withstanding the
operational difficulties of two decades of conflict around
it. Its conflict related position, as a safe zone for people
fleeing violence, contributed to the levels of trust that
further strengthened its role during the outbreak. The
faith based sector has also been identified as a key re-
source that has enabled effective response to Ebola out-
breaks in DRC [52]. No equivalent hospital took on this
role in Sierra Leone, with outbreak control reliant on gov-
ernment hospitals, affected by all the problems of weak
governance and depleted resources.
Timing may also have mediated against a repeat of the
Ugandan experience in West Africa. Both the explana-
tions of complacency premised on previous successful
control efforts, and of caution in relation to allegations
of over-reaction following measures taken to manage the
swine influenza outbreak of 2009 highlight path depend-
encies and factors that had affected global public health
thinking between 2001 and 2014.
These case studies have implications for the types of
investments in local, national and international health sys-
tems that are needed to enable effective response to Ebola
and other zoonotic diseases where they arise in conflict-
Table 1 A comparison of the features of the two case studies
Uganda 2000-2001 Sierra Leone 2014-15
Cases 425 13059
Case fatality rate 53 % 30 %
Response features National Task Force established within 4 days of MoH notification Delay in notification of MoH
CDC establishes local field laboratory Slow implementation of control measures
Effective co-ordination of international support Sharp rise in cases 2 months after notification of MoH
Basic control measures still absent 7 months into
outbreak
Human resource factors Significant difficulties but evidence of intrinsic motivation;
supportive environment and positive role of international
NGOs and experts.
Insufficient numbers, inadequate and inappropriate
training and poor motivation all documented
Media Effective use for public communication Antagonistic relationship between government and
press; accusations of government incompetence and
attempts at censorshipLimited scare mongering
Community level Some problems of stigma and distrust between community
and health authorities but some community responses highly
consistent with public health recommendations
Significant problems of lack of co-operation and trust,
and conflict between public health measures and
traditional practices
Institutional development Rapid development in South of country in preceding 15 years
provided basis for national institutional response
Limited economic and political recovery post conflict
probably contributed to failures
Importance of established faith based hospital
International response Fast, effective emergency response of agencies such as WHO
and CDC
Delayed response may have been premised on
complacency and political concerns.
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affected settings. At local level, building trust between
communities and health providers relies on investment in
a health workforce that is well supported financially, logis-
tically and managerially and can establish strong relation-
ships with service users. Understanding the importance of
trust based relationships between community and health
workers needs to inform reforms and projects with other
intentions such as increasing accountability.
At national level, resources and technical support to
those key functions that support local health workers
require mechanisms to ensure local understandings of
underlying issues are promoted, and effective co-ordination
of international aid. The role of the media is important:
public health authorities need to garner support for their
actions from the media which can be an important compo-
nent of the public education effort.
At international level, a re-prioritisation of infectious dis-
ease response readiness is required. The 2014-15 Ebola out-
break drew world attention to the strong interest that
wealthy economies have in investing in the resolution of
problems in weak states. The case studies help to identify
the specific investments that are likely to be helpful but also
highlight the complexity of the constellation of issues
involved.
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